

REVISED DRAFT

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RAJr.
27 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Planning

1. PROBLEM: This paper is submitted in response to your request that this Office make a study of whether an adequate mechanism exists within the ~~work of the organization~~ Central Intelligence Agency for the purpose of planning the future/intelli-
gence activities of the Agency and the Federal Government as a whole.

2. DISCUSSION: There is no single unit of the Agency at this time charged with the function of over-all planning for future intelligence activities of the CIA. Nor is there a group charged with advising the DCI as to action needed on a multi-agency basis to insure the proper discharge of the responsibilities of the "Intelligence Community" as a whole.

a. In actuality, the top-level planning body in the Agency exists in the form of your daily meeting with your Deputies, the Inspector General, Chief of Operations, Executive Assistant, and Assistant Director for Current Intelligence. Here problems are discussed and decisions taken. If further staff work is needed, action is generally referred to a specific Deputy Director with the responsibility resting on him for coordination both within and outside the Agency.

b. The Project Review Committee can be called a planning body from the viewpoint that it will review a plan, program or project and recommend to you to accept or reject the proposal. The great weakness of the PRC system is that considerable work may be done on a project prior to submission only to be rejected on policy, practicality or financial grounds. As a consequence the PRC on occasion finds itself performing a planning

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as well as a reviewing function. It is generally irrelevant to this paper because it almost never deals with intelligence projects or programs.

c. All other planning in the Agency, except that which may be done by committees, ad hoc or permanent, is done individually in the Offices of the Deputy Directors. (Annex I lists planning groups inside CIA.) Some of this planning may actually be done in inter-agency committees with the consequence that the Agency may be discussing advance plans with other agencies before there is top-level intra-CIA planning. (Annex 2 lists inter-agency committees that can affect CIA plans.)

d. One of the structural weakness in the Agency today is the lack of cross-utilization of the considerable expert talent in nearly all fields of major intelligence ~~and operational~~ interest. This cross-utilization should be undertaken only with necessary precautions to insure the compartmentalization required to preserve clandestine and covert operations. But some mechanism should exist within the agency to insure that the best available talent is utilized in developing plans on all subjects. Just as the DD/P Division or Branch Chief on Germany could provide useful advice and guidance to the ONE, OCI, OSI or ORR experts, so too might the latter prove valuable in discussing general principles concerning operations collection activities.

e. Coordination, both within CIA and inter-agency, is closely related to planning. As noted in Annex I, the former DD/I constituted the Office of Intelligence Coordination as his planning Office. It is felt that OIC is neither properly located, nor properly constituted, to perform Agency planning or, for that matter, coordination. It is wrong for a "line

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Office" to be performing solely staff functions; it places AD/IC in the position of negotiating with his fellow Assistant Directors and being an ambassador to the DD/P area with the result that OIC is primarily a recording office. The need for close correlation between planning and coordination is even greater with the ~~possibility~~ pressing need for CIA to engage in greater coordination of inter-agency activities.


f. The need for an over-all planning body is particularly acute with respect to long-range activities and policies. Examples include the integration of reconnaissance by air, noise listening and special intelligence with existing collection activities; the unification of collation activities so that a single economical master indexing system will lead analysts in any agency to all the information and intelligence that has been collected or produced; provision of intelligence estimates to NATO, etc., that are consistent with national intelligence but preserve U.S. security interests; presentation to the Bureau of the Budget and the committees of the Congress of intelligence budgets on a consolidated multi-agency basis. The responsibility for producing adequate studies and recommendations for the Director on such complicated and elusive matters should rest on a senior officer who does not have day-to-day operating and administrative duties. But, in order to insure close and intimate knowledge of Agency problems and to avoid creation of an ivory tower group divorced from reality, a CIA Planning Staff ~~should operate~~ should consist of the smallest possible nucleus of imaginative but tough-minded professionals and operate generally on a panel basis utilizing the experts on the particular subjects under consideration. This will also insure an equal work load on the top officials of the Agency. ~~Its work~~ It should

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be under the direction and guidance of an individual on your immediate staff. It should have a small secretariat to handle the paper work, draft reports, etc.

Possible Organization



The professionals should bring to bear experience and achievement in the following areas at least:

Intelligence production and estimating

Research and mechanical aids

Clandestine Collection

Special Intelligence and early warning

Budget and management

g. As additional but subordinate duties the planning staff might well undertake to advise you regarding shorter range problems widely affecting the Agency or the Community. For example, in dealing with the imposition of an over-all ceiling on the Agency's personnel, the planning staff would operate as follows:

Representatives from all components of the Agency would be given the opportunity to register their needs for personnel; the planning staff would prepare the staff study and recommendations for your consideration. Similarly, a reduction in the intelligence functions of the Department of State would be considered by the planning staff in the light of the over-all intelligence picture, and recommendations

made as to what functions should be dropped, what CIA should take

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over, etc. (Annex 3 lists some of the more immediate subjects for planning staff consideration.)

h. In real emergencies the staff would also be very useful:

If, for example, at 4 p.m. this afternoon an indication was received of the possibility of a new Berlin blockade by the Soviets, the CIA planning staff would meet immediately and prepare a "crash" plan for the Deputies and your early consideration, including such items as: a review of both overt and clandestine intelligence coverage and whether steps should be taken to augment it; a check of what the Office of Current Intelligence and Office of National Estimates planned to do on the subject; an indication of what material the Office of Research and Reports had on Berlin's ability to withstand a blockade; determination of what psychological warfare action was being taken or contemplated; assurance that proper coordination was being accomplished with State, Defense, Psychological Strategy Board, National Security Council Senior Staff, etc.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That a CIA Planning Staff be created to advise the Director on selected problems affecting the intelligence activities of the Agency and the Federal Government.

b. That a senior experienced officer be appointed Assistant to the Director for Planning and Coordination and charged with:

(1) Directing the work of the Planning Staff

(2) Advising the Director and the Deputies regarding the tasks

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assigned to the Staff and making recommendations as to additional problems to be attacked by it.

(3) Attending the regular "Deputies Meetings."

c. That the planning of non-intelligence activities of the Agency remain the responsibility of appropriate DD/P staffs, provided, however, that the Assistant for Plans and Coordination establish the liaison with such staffs necessary to ensure that their programs contribute to the maximum extent feasible to the intelligence mission of the Agency.